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A Constitution for Everyone
Bruce Ledewitz"
This article was adapted from my speech entitled "A Constitution for Everyone." Our Constitution is for everyone, but perhaps
not in the way people assume. Our federal constitution protects
everyone in the sense that all citizens may rely upon it in court, if
necessary. But the Constitution is also for everyone in the sense
that constitutional interpretation itself is a public and popular
responsibility -- and ought to be such.

We can approach these issues by asking what is, and what
should be, the relationship of law to democracy in America. On
the level of positive law -- statutes, regulations and so forth -- the

relationship of law to democracy is easily stated. Democracy is
the selection by a majority of the voters of representatives who, in
turn, make the laws. Presumably these laws represent the will of
the majority. Law at this level is how the people rule.
In terms of constitutional law, however, the relationship of law
to democracy is different. The Constitution puts limits on what
the majority, through their representatives, may enact as law.
Some of these limits are structural, such as the provision of separate constituencies for electing Presidents, Senators, and representatives. Some of these constitutional limits are substantive,
however, such as the protection of free speech from Congressional
regulation by the First Amendment. We refer to these limits on
the majority as "Madisonian Democracy," after James Madison,
considered by many to be the father of the Constitution.
The text of the Constitution does not resolve what institution, if
any, has the authority to interpret what these constitutional limits on the majority mean. Over time, Americans have come to accept that the courts, and the United States Supreme Court preeminently, interpret the Constitution in a binding way.
Therefore, we may say that in our system, the relationship of
law to democracy is that in many areas of life, the majority rules
through its authority to select government representatives; in
* This article was adapted from a speech that was delivered by Professor Bruce Ledewitz, Duquesne University School of Law, at the Lawrence County, Pennsylvania Law
Day Program on May 3, 2004, at the invitation of the Lawrence County Bar Association.
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other areas, the majority is not permitted to rule. The courts define the difference.
Not only would most lawyers agree that this is an apt description of our current system, most lawyers and judges would add
that this is a good system, one much better than simple and universal majority rule. They would say that the majority should not
be permitted to interpret the Constitution, both because ordinary
people lack the technical expertise to interpret in accordance with
precedent, text and history and because the majority is potentially
self-interested, and thus might grant to itself illegitimate authority to legislate, or even grant to itself permanent political advantage. But our Constitution and its system of interpretation is not
actually centered in the courts. Our system is already more democratic than we generally assume, and is already a Constitution
for Everyone.
In one sense it is obvious that the people rule in the matter of
the content of the Constitution. The power to amend the Constitution gives to a large voting majority the authority to add to or
change the language of the Constitution.
A constitutional
amendment regarding gay marriage, for example, would require
the vote of at least two-thirds of each House of Congress or of at
least three-quarters of the states. Whether one believes that the
Constitution should be amended in this way, or not, everyone here
would agree that the people as a whole will ultimately decide this
issue.
The amendment power goes beyond the power of the majority to
add subjects to the Constitution, as in the case of a proposed prohibition on gay marriage. The amendment power also allows the
majority to, in effect, reverse decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Constitution. The power of the majority to amend the United States Constitution has been used for
this purpose throughout American constitutional history, one of
the earliest episodes being the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution,1 which effectively overruled the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Chisolm v. Georgia.2 The ability of the majority
to amend the constitution is a power so great that it has been suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist that the protection of free
1. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state." U.S. CONST. Amend. XI.
2. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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speech -- certainly a core constitutional value -- could be removed
from the Constitution by amendment.
But is the amendment power the only way that the people rule
in regard to the meaning of the Constitution? Are the only two
choices available to the people when they disagree with the Supreme Court either to accept the dictate of the Court or to amend
the Constitution? One of our great Justices -- John M. Harlan -answered that question in the negative in a classic quotation of
American legal/political thinking. In his view, the people ultimately control the interpretation of their Constitution. In other
words, the Constitution is not for everyone only when the people
engage in amendment. The Constitution is always for everyone.
Justice Harlan, usually referred to as "the younger" to distinguish him from his grandfather, who also served on the high
Court, was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1955 and served
sixteen years, until 1971. Justice Harlan served during the years
of the liberal Warren Court and was thought of as a conservative
minority voice.
This is not, however, an entirely accurate understanding of Justice Harlan. He was not a conservative because he was not any
sort of ideologue. He was cautious and did have a sense of the limits of the judicial craft. But he did not locate that limit in a theory. Justice Harlan's most important insight for our purposes was
in describing the way law operates in a democratic society. He
stated this insight in the context of what is today called substantive due process -- the area of constitutional interpretation where
the Justices are least constrained by text and history. Justice
Harlan did not believe that indiscriminate resort to the courts to
decide social problems was wise or prudent. But he did not shy
away from the exercise of judgment. In the context of the following quotation, Justice Harlan was urging his fellow Justices to
decide the issue of Connecticut's criminalization of the use of birth
control information and devices as applied to a married couple. Of
course, the right to birth control information or the privacy of a
married couple is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, but
Justice Harlan was willing to address these matters anyway.
Justice Harlan condemned the Connecticut anti-birth control
statute in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:' "a statute making it a
criminal offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an
intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of
3.

367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961).
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the most intimate concerns of an individual's personal life." But,
of course, that language invites the challenge, by what right does
the Court decide this matter? There is nothing in the text of the
Constitution about birth control, or even literally about privacy.
How does the Court, then, avoid undue interference with democratic decision-making?
Justice Harlan's response to this charge set the matter in a larger context. Harlan wrote this about the Court's decisions generally:
[T]hrough the course of this Court's decisions [due process] has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. [The] balance of
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard
to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed
as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from
it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what
has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a
substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.4
Notice that in terms of how constitutional meaning unfolds, for
Justice Harlan, judicial decisions have only a limited part to play.
The "Nation" and the "country" strike the balance of that tradition, rather than the Court. Judicial decisions are just one part -and not the most important part -- of the way this balance comes
about. And if the decisions of the Court are far out of step with
the country's understanding, the decisions do not survive. Justice
Harlan is not saying that this is how things should be. He is saying that this. is how they are. We are already democratic. The
people already rule.
Justice Harlan does not describe how judicial decisions outside
the tradition are eroded and overturned. But we can surmise that
it is public opinion that accomplishes this result. As Abraham
Lincoln said about our democratic community in the LincolnDouglas debates of 1858:
In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything.
With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can

4.

Id. at 542.
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succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes
deeper than he who enacts statutes and pronounces decisions.'
We can call this understanding of Constitutional meaning one of
democratic consensus. Over time, certain important constitutional decisions are fully accepted by the people. Conversely,
other decisions are rejected. No judicial opinion can fail in the one
instance or succeed in the other. This understanding of the role of
democratic consensus should be a liberating insight for law, which
has struggled over its supposed right to rule the people in a democracy. Many theories have been proposed to justify law's
power. Justice Harlan's response is very different. He says that
law does not rule over the people.
There are many examples of powerful interaction between judicial decision and democratic consensus. For example, the power of
Brown v. Board of Education6 was that it achieved deep popular
acceptance. This happened even though the decision was, and
remains, widely recognized as badly reasoned and even though the
decision sparked massive resistance. Without that political support, Brown would never have had the impact that it did. Even
where heroic Federal District Judges acted to implement Brown in
the face of strong local opposition, they acted against a backdrop of
powerful and growing national political support Conversely, Roe
v. Wade7 -- the abortion decision -- has never achieved popular legitimacy. Consequently, Roe has been eroded over the years.
When the public really cares about something, the Court can
sometimes respond quickly to public opinion. This occurred when
the Court struck down the death penalty in 1972.8 By 1976, the
Court got the message of widespread public opposition and reversed itself.9 Even when it looks like the Court is acting in the
face of public opposition, the public ultimately gets its way. So,
the Warren Court decisions protecting criminal defendants, which
coincided with an increase in the crime rate, sparked a widespread
public feeling that the courts had gone "too far." What happened
next illustrates Justice Harlan's point. The process of retrenchment was not dramatic. President Nixon ran for office in part
5. Abraham Lincoln, First Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Ottawa, Illinois, in Abraham
Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1832-1858, at 495, 524-35 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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against the Court in 1968 (for "law and order") and Nixon's subsequent nominations to the federal bench began to alter the balance
in judicial opinions among defendants, victims, and society. No
Justice really changed his or her mind on Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth
Amendment issues in the face of public opposition, but the case
law ultimately was affected by public response.
Later, the public began to change its view about constitutional
protections in criminal cases and began to favor judicial restriction
of the powers of the police. By the year 2000, when the Court belatedly discovered that Congress earlier had attempted to overturn the Miranda decision, the public appeared to have endorsed
Miranda warnings as a healthy restriction on police overreaching.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dickerson v. United States"
upholding Miranda makes little sense doctrinally, given that the
warnings were never regarded as actually required by the Fifth
Amendment.
In nevertheless reaffirming Miranda, Justice
Rehnquist as much as endorsed the theory of democratic consensus in interpreting the Constitution. The warnings were upheld
in light of the fact that they had "become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
the national culture."'"
The notion of a Constitution for everyone is a surprise for lawyers to hear. The current Justices on the Supreme Court, though
divided over what the Court should decide and how, would probably all reject Justice Harlan's insight. They believe that once they
decide a matter, if their decision is a "proper" one, the matter is
closed, without regard to what the public thinks about it. Liberal
Justices believe this as well as conservative ones. This perspective is also true of law professors and maybe the bar in general.
Law as a profession seems much less committed to democracy
than it used to be. As an example, every year the American Association of Law Schools holds a January convention over three days
with several main presentations and numerous smaller scale
workshops. An informal survey of the 2003 convention yielded not
one presentation with the word "democracy" in the title.
On the other hand, some legal voices, Professor Charles Black of
Yale Law School for one, have also said that, in a democracy, there
must be some ultimate way that the people rule over the meaning
10.
11.

530 U.S. 428 (2000).
Id. at 443.
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of their Constitution. Professor Black thought that limit lay in the
power of Congress to control the jurisdiction of the courts. Today,
voices as politically diverse as those of Mark Tushnet and Robert
Bork argue for restrictions on the Court's power of constitutional
interpretation in the name of democracy. 2 Justice Harlan teaches
us that a democratic limit on the Court already exists and that we
do not need to worry about changing structure in order to provide
democratic control over constitutional interpretation.
The understanding of law as controlled by democratic consensus
is admittedly vague in many ways. For one thing, how does the
public keep a case in mind once the Court decides it? Until a case
begins to have dramatic effects that the public sees, the decision
will not generate effective national outrage. Second, often there
are political ways to undercut an unpopular constitutional decision, so that the issue decided does not come up again. Third,
most constitutional decisions appear to be technical constructs
whose very terms frustrate public understanding. Even media
interpreters sometimes have trouble understanding cases with
shifting majorities spread over fifty or sixty pages of the United
States Case Reports.
Nevertheless, although democratic control over the courts is
subtle, it does exist. The public has the last word in important
constitutional interpretations. It might be objected that the longterm weight of public opinion and correction does not justify the
Court's illegitimate decision-making. Even if the people rule in
the long run, they do not rule in the short run. The consensus
necessary to undercut a judicial decision is greater than a mere
majority that could be said to have a right to rule. For instance,
there have been abortions that might not have taken place had
Roe not been decided. If Roe was in some sense wrong, either by
its method of interpretation or by result, the decision about abortion law should have been made in the legislative branch.
This is a legitimate concern. Justice Harlan was not suggesting
in this quote that because the people rule, the Justices can do anything they want, relying on the people to correct their mistakes.
Only certain matters are fit for judicial decision. That division of
deciding is itself part of the tradition of which he speaks. Harlan
12. See Mark Tushnett, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) and
Robert Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline,
325 (1996) (suggesting a constitutional amendment to make the ruling of the Supreme
Court subject to democratic review).
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was describing what inevitably happens when the Court does decide a matter, especially when the Court decides wrongly.It should
be added that we don't know ahead of time whether decisions by
the Court are "right" or "wrong". Those who say that constitutional law is about finding a proper method of constitutional interpretation are mistaken. Constitutional interpretation is not an
esoteric professional engagement, but a matter of governance. In
a democracy, the sentiment of the people is always the key element, and should be the key element, in governance. So, public
response to Supreme Court decisions is the best method we have
for assuring democratic legitimacy on the part of the Court.
The real power of democratic consensus in our society should
change our way of thinking about the correctness of judicial decisions. Because lawyers and law professors think that courts control, and should control, interpretation of the Constitution, constitutional law books do not address the relationship of the courts to
democracy, except to repeat the misleading formula that the
courts are anti-majoritarian compared to the legislature. If courts
are subject to the will of the people, then they are not completely
undemocratic. Indeed, given the relationship of judicial decisions
and democratic consensus, we can ask whether the courts are in
fact less democratic than legislatures. In one recent example, the
Texas anti-sodomy statute, which the Court struck down in 2003,'3
was not an expression of the will of the people of Texas. We know
this because the statute was hardly ever enforced. We also know
this because when the Court struck down the statute, there was
almost no fallout on the issue of criminalizing homosexual sex
(though there was plenty of fallout on the issue of homosexual
marriage). It was the Court, rather than the Texas legislature,
that represented the will of the people in this instance.
How did that happen? How could an unelected Court be more
in touch, not just with where the people are, but where they are
going? In his book, The Future of Freedom, Fareed Zakaria, wrote
that institutions that do not directly represent the people, like the
Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve Board, can be more capable of leadership than are legislatures. 4 This was certainly true in
the original Connecticut birth control cases, out of which Justice
13. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
14. Fareed Zakaria argues that it is in part this very insensitivity to public opinion that
gives the Federal Reserve Board and the Supreme Court their prestige with the public. See
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, 248
(2003).
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Harlan spoke. In Connecticut, at that time, the Catholic Church
was too politically powerful to allow repeal of a largely unenforced,
symbolic ban on contraceptives. When the Court finally struck
down the Connecticut anti-birth control statute, 5 there was no
political fallout in Connecticut.
What both the Texas sodomy example and the Connecticut birth
control example suggest is that Justice Harlan was not just presenting his understanding of the relationship between law and
democracy. Rather, his understanding of democratic consensus is
also an interpretation of democracy itself. For, just as this society
forms democratic consensus around particular judicial decisions,
so too do we form such consensus around other political issues.
And when the people do form such an organic consensus on an
issue, whether it be the retention of social security or the engagement with Communism, all institutions of government bend in
that direction. At such a point, even elections are not the key democratic event. In the face of democratic consensus, the problems
of special interests, the political influence of the wealthy and
negative political advertising and even low voter turnout, cease to
present essential threats to democracy. As long as the conditions
of freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of association exist, we will have the basis for the formation of democratic
consensus -- and thus the basis of a democratic society.
Today, not only is our Constitution a Constitution for everyone,
but our entire system of government is a government for everyone
-- not as a dream or a hope but in reality. And although this is
surely reassuring to a democratic people, it places the responsibility for governing in all areas directly on us -- on we the people.

15.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

